Abstract. Against the background of supply chains, this paper constructs a class Hotelling model to describe and explore sequential auctions of close substitutes with slightly more general associated valuations. In this generalized model, both close substitutes and bidders are hypothetically distributed at the interval [0; 1], types of bidders are continuous, and each bidder's valuations for close substitutes are not independent. Moreover, with the aid of this model, equilibriums are explored, and e ciencies of the auctions are analyzed under second-price sealed-bid auction formats. Further, considering two typical information policies, we investigate some concrete bids and revenues of the e cient sequential auctions, while bidders' valuations are linear functions of distances between them and close substitutes. Results show that e ciencies of the sequential auctions are conditional, and in uences of information policies on revenues of the auctions are related to both numbers of bidders and locations of items.
Introduction
In 1929, Hotelling developed a model of spatial competitions to demonstrate relationships between locations and pricing behaviors of rms through a line of xed length and predict an aggregation of two competing rms in the middle of the customers' support interval [1, 2] . The standard Hotelling model assumes that all consumers are identical (except for locations) and evenly dispersed along the line; both the rms and consumers respond to changes in demand and the economic environment. As a game model, it can also be used to describe some auction problems in supply chains: m suppliers sell their supply contracts sequentially or simultaneously to n agents with unitdemands via auctions, and both suppliers and agents are located in the same tra c line. Here, suppliers and agents correspond to rms and customers, respectively. In addition, these contracts are deterministic and undi erentiated for agents; thus, di erences among agents' valuations for contracts mainly depend on their transportation costs.
The above-mentioned problem can be abstracted as sequential auctions of close substitutes. Since the distance between an agent and his or her suppliers is considered, each agent's valuations for the suppliers' contracts are also considered, which are di erent from interdependent valuations among agents [3] . Hence, by means of the Hotelling model, our paper tries to focus on sequential auctions of close substitutes with slightly more general associated valuations. Here, key functions of close substitutes are the same or similar; however, their con gurations or external performances are slightly di erent so that various needs of consumers are met; thus, the private valuations of consumers are not exactly the same.
A key consideration of sequential auctions is a bidder's expected surplus for the follow-up auctions, which is usually concerned with future objects, bidder numbers, previous winning information, etc. Thus, information policy is always an important topic for auctions or other business activities, and theoretical and experimental studies have shown that revealing some information in advance will possibly a ect the overall e ciency and revenues of auctions [4, 5] . Presently, there are major controversies and, consequently, a large body of literature about sequential auctions and information policies. Usually, while auctioned objects are heterogeneous and bidders' valuations are independent of each other, an expected revenue-maximizing auctioneer should fully and publicly reveal all information about auctioned objects [6] [7] [8] . However, while auctioned objects are homogeneous and bidders' valuations are not mutually independent, it was revealed that future objects or other related information in advance would uncertainly a ect the overall e ciency and revenues of sequential auctions [9] [10] [11] [12] . Currently, in these pieces of literature, a bidder's valuations for homogeneous objects are usually supposed to be identical or proportional, which may be considered as especially associated valuations and lead to learning behaviors [13] . Owing to the di culty of modeling general associated valuations and processing mathematical expectations while a bidder type is multidimensional and continuous, existing researches mostly focus on sequential auctions where a bidder type is hypothetically discrete, namely H (High) or L (Low), and his or her valuations of objects are identical.
Recently, Zeithammer [14] studied sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects, discussed the in uence of revealing future objects on auction e ciency and proved the existence of symmetric equilibriums and pure bidding strategies. Bayesian methods and the models used for processing a multi-dimensional continuous type in his paper inspired our studies. Accordingly, combined with characteristics of supply chains, this paper explores the class Hotelling model for describing sequential auctions with some particular assumptions under second-price sealed-bid auction mechanisms. In the proposed model of the current study, both close substitutes and bidders are hypothetically distributed at the interval [0; 1]; a bidder type is continuous and multi-dimensional (namely, each bidder has di erent valuations for each close substitute); each bidder's valuations for close substitutes are not independent. Moreover, this model can skillfully convert multi-dimensional types into one-dimensional types via interdependence of distances between bidders and items in [0; 1].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 states formally the sequential auctions of close substitutes with associated valuations and constructs a class Hotelling model. Section 3 proves the existence of equilibrium bids based on the model under the second-price sealed-bid auction format and explores some conditions of e cient auctions. Further, information policies, equilibrium bids, and overall revenues of the sequential auctions of close substitutes with especially associated valuations are speci cally deduced and discussed in Section 4. Relevant conclusions are summarized in Section 5.
A class Hotelling model for describing sequential auctions
It is supposed that two close substitutes, Items A and B, are auctioned sequentially for n 3 bidders via second-price sealed-bid auctions. Auction rules and some assumptions are as follows: 1. Item A is sold at the rst auction, and Item B is sold at the second one. In addition, at each auction, the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the second highest bid. A tie is broken by rolling a fair coin; 2. Each bidder is risk neutral and has a unit-demand; accordingly, the bidder with Item A will exit the second auction; 3. Both items and bidders are distributed at the interval [0; 1] and mutually stochastically independent, as Figure 1 shows. [15] . When making trades in real-life markets, it is imperative to consider the factor of cost in general and its various types such as transportation costs or maintenance costs, which usually increase the functions of transportation distances. In this paper, V k is the same for all bidders. However, when taking into account transportation cost (d k ), each bidder's true valuation for k 2 fA; Bg should be V k (d k ), which is di erent from those of other bidders. Figure 1 shows the class Hotelling model. In Figure 1 Figure 1 can be used approximatively to describe sequential auctions of close substitutes with particular assumptions of non-independent valuations, under which the probability of Bidder t winning Item B is intuitively relevant to one of his or her winning A. Concurrently, by means of t, our model skillfully converts a two-dimensional type of a bidder into a onedimensional one. Thus, t may be also regarded as the bidder type.
Equilibrium and winners
Because the second stage of the sequential auctions in this paper is actually a private-value second-price sealed-bid auction, Bidder t's dominant strategy for Item B is to bid his or her own valuation for Item B, namely b B (t) = v B (t). However, deciding the bid for Item A is more complicated than that for Item B, because Bidder t will consider his or her expected surplus in the second stage.
Let: x = max be the probability distribution function of the highest valuation of the remaining bidders (except t) at the second auction. Then, Bidder t 2 (x) can win Item B with a probability of n 2= t (v B (t); (x)), and his expected surplus at the second auction is as follows:
Obviously, winning Item A is more bene cial to t if and (b A ()) or x < b A (t) < x 0 , Bidder t is indi erent to bid x 0 or b A (t). While b A (t) < x < x 0 , Bidder t will lose Item A and his expected surplus at the second auction is (v B (t); x). Notice that S(x) > S(x 0 ) = 0 because S(x) strictly monotonically decreases with x < x 0 . Accordingly, (v B (t); x) < v A (t) x. Notice that v A (t) x is Bidder t's surplus if he or she bids x 0 and wins Item A. Therefore, bidding b A (t) < x 0 is worse than bidding x 0 for Bidder t.
A similar proof shows that bidding b A (t) > x 0 is worse for Bidder t. Therefore, b A (t) = x 0 is Bidder t's equilibrium bid for Item A.
Remark 3. Essentially, 1 + @(vB(t);x) @x > 0 is the su cient and necessary condition of v A (t) (v B (t); x) that has a xed point, which is Bidder t's equilibrium bid for Item A. Here, v A (t) b A (t) and (v B (t); b A (t)) are Bidder t's expected surplus at the rst auction and that at the second auction, respectively. Accordingly, Proposition 1 implies that winning Item A or B should yield the same expected surplus for Bidder t while he or she determines the optimal bid for Item A. Intuitively, Proposition 1 is also appropriate for sequential auctions of more than two items while Item A is regarded as the current item and Item B as the sum of all follow-up (or future) items.
Based on Proposition 1, Propositions 2 and 3 identify the winner at the rst auction. 
Namely:
In Eq. 
and:
is a decreasing function of d A (t) and an increasing function of v A (t) = V A (d A (t)). Therefore, Bidder t nearest to Item A (i.e., t = arg min t 1 ;t 2 ; t n d A (t i ) = arg min t 1 ;t 2 ; t n jt i j) will win Item A at the rst auction.
As a direct result of Proposition 2, the following corollary is obtained. 
Notice that: @(v B (t); b A (t)) @v B (t) = n 2= t (v B (t); (b A (t))) 1;
If t , then d B (t) = t = d A (t) ( ) d A (t) (* t ) and . Accordingly, ddB(t) dd A (t) = 1 and Remark 4. Corollary 2 shows that the e ciency of the sequential auctions described by the class Hotelling model is conditional. More speci cally, locations of suppliers and agents in a tra c line should be considered for the auctions of supply contracts in Section 1.
Bids and information policies about
The key to determining the equilibrium bid b A (t) = v A (t) (v B (t); b A (t)) in Proposition 1 is the expected surplus:
d n 2= t (z; (b A (t))); in which both v B (t) and n 2= t (z; (b A (t))) are closely related to the location of Item B. Thus, in order to obtain a concrete formula of (v B (t); b A (t)), we need to consider information policies about 2 [0; 1], namely revealing Item B or hiding Item B before the auction of Item A ends. Here, revealing Item B means that all bidders know , and hiding Item B means that all bidders do not know until the rst auction ends. In this section, we will apply the class Hotelling model to deduce some concrete equilibrium bids of sequential auctions of close substitutes.
Intuitively, any bidder at auctions subjectively regards himself or herself as a marginal loser [12] or winner, because he or she will rationally give up auctions if he or she nds no opportunities to win. Here, a marginal loser or winner respectively points to the loser with the highest bid or the winner with the lowest bid. Speci cally, in our class Hotellling model with (d k ) = d k , the bidder nearest to Item A will win according to Proposition 2 or Proposition 3. Thus, Bidder t regarding himself or herself as a marginal loser or winner of Item A always believes that the rest of his or her opponents are distributed on his right side (namely in [t; 1]), except none of his opponents distributed in [0; t). Such an idea of a preponderant rival exactly leads to the bidding equilibrium mentioned by Proposition 1. For convenience, Bidder t is called a preponderant rival of Item A if and only if there is at most one opponent in [0; t).
In order to facilitate discussions, it is assumed in this section that: F (x) ) and g(x) (G(x)) denote the probability density (probability distribution) of t and one of , respectively.
By means of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2, we will deduce the expected surplus (v B (t); b A (t)) of Bidder t as a preponderant rival and verify and prove that b A (t) = v A (t) (v B (t); b A (t)) is exactly his or her equilibrium bid for Item A. . Thus, three cases need to be considered for . Figure 2 shows the case of W 2. By observing Figure 2 , the optimal solution t of Eq. (2) t) ). In addition, the other cases can be inferred similarly.
Equilibrium bids when revealing
Finally, a concrete formula of (v B (t); b A (t)) is related to the speci c probability distribution of t and one of . 
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(v B (t); b A (t)) = 0:
Proposition 4. If is revealed before auctioning 
Let: Hence:
3. 2 W 3: (1+t)=2 means v B (t) = 1 +t .
Then:
Hence:
Therefore, Bidder t's equilibrium bid for Item A should be b A (t) = 1 t (v B (t); b A (t)), where (v B (t); b A (t)) is shown as in Eqs. (5), (6) , and (7). It is also easy to verify db A (t) dt < 0 through Eqs. (5), (6) , and (7). Thus, Item A will be allocated to the bidder with the highest valuation, namely one closest to A.
Remark 5. Eqs. (5), (6) , and (7) imply that Bidder t = 1 or t 2 1 always bids his or her true valuation in the rst stage because he or she as a preponderant rival of Item A believes in advance that his or her expected surplus of winning Item B will be 0. However, Bidders t = 0 always hide their surplus 
Equilibrium bids when hiding
Item B (namely ) is hidden before the end of auctioning A. Each bidder knows = 0, his or her own location (or type) t, and bidders' number n and does not know and other bidders' locations (or types). However, he or she regards other bidders' locations as random variables distributed in [0; 1], and believes that Item B is also distributed in [0; 1]. Similar to Section 4.1, the key to determining the equilibrium bid is the expected surplus of winning Item B.
While is regarded as a random variable, Bidder t's expected surplus of winning B is ( ; b 0 A (t)) = E [(v B (t); b A (t))], and Bidder t's equilibrium bid for Item A should be b 0 A (t) = v A (t) ( ; b 0 A (t)). Hence: 
Further researches
Let R k (n) denote the auctioneer's expected revenue from selling Item k 2 fA; Bg while is revealed and R 0 k (n) denote the aforementioned expected revenue while is hidden, where n is the number of bidders. Then, R(n) = R A (n) + R B (n) is the auctioneer's total expected revenue at two auctions while is revealed and R 0 (n) = R 0 A (n) + R 0 B (n) is the aforementioned total revenue while is hidden. In the second stage, the dominant strategies of bidders are to bid their own valuations. Accordingly, expected revenues from selling Item B are the same under the above two information policies, namely R B (n) = R 0 B (n). Thus, the di erence between the total expected revenues R(n) and R 0 (n) is mainly determined by R A (n) and R 0 A (n). Di erent from bidders, an auctioneer only knows , , and n in advance and does not know locations of bidders, yet believes that bidders are distributed in [0; 1]. Therefore, with respect to the expected revenue from selling Item A, R A (n) or R 0 A (n) is determined by the expectation of max t b A (t) or max t b 0 A (t). Thus, while (1 2 +t) n 1 (n 1)(1 t) n 2 n(1 t) n 1 dt (1 t) 1 + 2(n 1)t (2n 1)t 2 2n(n 1) n(1 t) n 1 dt = 1 (2n 1)(n + 3) 2(n 1)(n + 1)(n + 2) :
Curve clusters of R A (n) and R 0 A (n) with n and are shown in Figures 3 and 4 , respectively. They visually show the following propositions. Proposition 6. R A (n) is monotonically increasing functions of n and ; R 0 A (n) is monotonically increasing functions of n. Eqs. (10) and (11) show complicated in uences of and n on the expected revenue. Here, both Proposition 6 and Figure 4 imply that if n is given, then there must exist 0 to satisfy R A (n) R 0 A (n) while 0 , and R A (n) R 0 A (n) while 0 . However, it is di cult to x the exact value of 0 with n. Next, Proposition 7 provides some su cient conditions with respect to comparisons of both R A (n) and R 0 A (n).
Proposition 7. Let n 3. Here, R A (n) R 0 A (n) (R A (n) > R 0 A (n)) means that expected revenue for A while revealing is less (more) than that while hiding . Proposition 7 implies that revealing the latter items in advance would uncertainly a ect the overall e ciency and revenues of sequential auctions, which is consistent with ndings of Cason [5] , Jane and David [13] , Mikusheva [9] , Jackson and Kremer [10] , Kannan [11] , Rao et al. [16, 17] , and Colucci et al. [18] . Owing to R B (n) = R 0 B (n), Proposition 7 is also su cient to compare R(n) with R 0 (n).
Conclusions
Focusing on sequential auctions of close substitutes with slightly more general associated valuations, this paper constructed a class Hotelling model and discussed equilibrium bids under second-price sealed-bid auction formats. Conclusions showed that sequential auctions described by this model were e cient while bidders' valuations satis ed conditions given by Corollary 2. Thus, the class Hotelling model could be used as a support to deal with some auctions in supply chains. It is helpful for the analysis and design of some business mechanisms.
Through the instrumentality of this model, some sequential auctions were speci cally explored, while a bidder's valuation was a linear function of a distance between him or her and an item. The equilibrium bid of a bidder as a preponderant rival was deduced and veri ed. In addition, it depends on both numbers of bidders and locations of items whether the latter item (namely Item B) should be revealed or hidden. Generally, revealing information usually improves revenues of auctions with assumptions of independent valuations for multi-items. However, our conclusions are more complicated because each bidder's valuations for Items A and B are not independent in our paper, yet are correlated. In this paper, although the sequential auctions with only two items seem simple or farfetched, the characterization of the class Hotelling model for two items is an important step in achieving similar characterizations of models with more than two items. 
